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ALIENABILITY AND TRANSMISSIBILITY OF
FUTURE INTERESTS IN MARYLAND
By RUSSELL R. RE.No*
In any discussion of the transferability of future inter-
ests in real property, it is convenient to classify the six
future interests into three groups:
a. Reversions and Vested Remainders
A reversion is the future estate left in the grantor or
testator's heirs when he has conveyed or devised less than
his entire interest in the land,2 while a remainder is a future
interest, conveyed or devised to a transferee, which will
become possessory at the termination of a particular estate*
created by the same instrument in another transferee.4 A
remainder is said to be vested when the remainderman is
ascertained, and when it is not subject to any condition pre-
cedent other than the termination of the particular estate.5
A reversion, since it arises automatically, is never subject
to a condition precedent, and is therefore always vested.
Thus, this first group consists of the two types of vested
future interests.
b. Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests
A remainder is said to be contingent if either the re-
mainderman is unascertzined, or it is subject to a condition
precedent which may not happen until the termination of
* A.B., 1931, LL.B., 1927, University of Illinois. Assistant Professor of
Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
'Reversions, vested remainders, contingent remainders, executory inter-
ests, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry.
, Restatement of Property,.jSee. 154.
' The term "particular estate" applies to any estate less than a fee, L e., a
life estate or an estate for years.
'Restatement of Property, See. 156.
Did, See. 157.
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the particular estate.' An executory interest, often called
an executory devise or executory estate, is a future interest
in a transferee, created under the Statute of Uses or Statute
of Wills, which operates to divest a prior estate, usually one
in fee, rather than to succeed a prior particular estate.
Since an executory interest operates as a divestment of o
prior estate it must always depend upon the occurrence of a
condition precedent, and is therefore always contingent.'
Thus, the second group consists of the two most important
types of contingent future interests.
c. Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry"
These are reversionary interests left in either the
grantor or the heirs of the testator. The former results
when a determinable fee simple estate is created,9 and the
latter when the estate conveyed or devised is subject to a
condition subsequent."' Both interests are dependent upon
the happening of a condition precedent, and are therefore
inherently contingent, yet because they are reversionary in
character they must be considered independently from the
second group.
The problem of transferability of these interests falls
into two separate phases: one, intervivos alienation, and
the other, transmission upon death by intestate succession
or testamentary disposition.
INMMr Vivos ALIENATION
a. Reversions and Vested Remainders.
.From the earliest English cases, the courts experienced
no difficulty in upholding the alienability of reversions and
vested remainders by any form of conveyance that would
be sufficient to pass a possessory estate. These are vested
interests and have all of the qualities of an estate in land.
Simes, Future Interests, Sec. 68,
Restatement of Property, See. 149.
'The Restatement of Property uses the term "power of termination"
rather than the commonly accepted term "right of entry". Sec. 24, Special
Note.
I Restatement of Property, Sec. 154.
10 Ibd, See. 155.
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As far as tenuity is concerned, a vested future estate call
not be said to be less tenuous than a present possessory
estate. If a future interest is vested, it is not a mere. possi-
bility of an estate but has become an existing estate, which
by the process of time alone will become possessory.
b. Contingent Remainders and Executory interests.
However, contingent future interests lack this certainty,
and the early English cases treated them as mere "possi-
bilities", falling short of having sufficient certainty to be
called "interests". As a result of their tenuous character,
and because of an unholy fear of champerty, the English
common law appears to have long been settled that an ex-
ecutory interest or a contingent remainder was inalienable
inter vivos." The undesirable effect of thus restraining
alienability soon became evident, and the courts then began
an evolutionary process of destroying the rule by building
up exceptions.
In In re Banks' Wi1 our Court of Appeals carved an
exception into the common law rule by distinguishing be-
tween a contingent estate where the taker is. unascertained
and a contingent estate where the taker is fully ascertained
but the estate is contingent upon the happening of a condi-
tion precedent. Where the taker is fully ascertained, but
the contingency is solely dependent upon the happening of
an event, i. e., a condition precedent, the contingent interest,
whether a contingent remainder or an executory interest,
was held to be alienable inter vivos to the same extent as a
vested future estate. A future interest may be contingent
for either of two reasons: First, the taker may be unascer-
tained. This occurs where the taker is described by a gen-
eral description, often a class description such as "chil-
dren", and there is no one' who answers the description,
either because the description is to be applied at a future
date, for example, "to the children of A living at A's
death", or because there is no person who can answer the
description yet in esse. Secondly, the future interest may
21 Third Report of Commissioners on the Law of Real Property, 26
(18 32).
1187 Md. 423, 40 Aft. 28 (1808).
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be contingent because it depends upon the happening of an
event as a condition precedent for example, "if A dies
without issue then to B". It is this second type of contin-
gent future interest that is rendered alienable." The adop-
tion of this exception to the common law rule made alienable
the majority of contingent remainders and executory inter-
ests, leaving inalienable only those where the taker was un-
ascertained.
However, in In re Banks' Will the Court held that the
executory interest was contingent both upon the happening
of an event and also because the taker was unascertained,
and therefore was inalienable as not within the exception.
In that case the gift of the remainder was to the children of
the testator's daughters, but "if any child of my daughter
die before attaining twenty-one years and without issue",
then to "such persons as by the then existing laws of Mary-
land would take the same as my heirs at law and distribu-
tees". This executory interest over to the testator's heirs
at law was clearly contingent, both because a condition
precedent must have occurred, i. e., death of a child of a
daughter before reaching twenty-one without issue, and also
because the takers were a class, i. e., the testator's heirs at
law, which was not to be ascertained until the above event
had occurred. Thus, prior to death of a child of a daughter,
an heir at law of the testator was merely a prospective mem-
ber of the class, as the class could only be ascertained when
the event occurred. The class was limited to the testator's
heirs at law "by the then1 4 existing laws of Maryland,"
meaning persons who were heirs at law when the event oc-
curred. Upon this basis the takers of this executory inter-
est were unascertained, and the interest was inalienable by
a prospective member of this class, prior to the happening
of the condition precedent.
This decision, upholding the common law rule as to the
inalienability of contingent remainders and executory in-
terests where the contingency relates to the person, i. e., the
.2 This Is often described as a "vested Interest in a contingent remainder".
This is an ambiguous use of the term vested, and should be more correctly
described as a "transferable Interest" in a contingent remainder or execu-
tory interest
a, Italics ours.
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taker is unascertained, seems to have been followed without
question until Reilly v. Mackenzie5 was decided. This later
case involved the alienability of a gift of the remainder at
the death of the life tenant, the testator's widow, to "my
said eight children should they be then living." Unlike It
re Banks' Will this remainder involved no condition prece-
dent, and the only contingency, if any, was as to the ascer-
tainment of the takers. Counsel for one side contended that
the eight children took vested remainders subject to divest-
ment by their death before the mother, and therefore had
an alienable estate.16 On the contrary it was contended
that the class was not to be ascertained until the death of
the mother, and thus each child took only a contingent re-
mainder; and as the contingency related to the time for
ascertaining the remaindermen, it was inalienable. The
Court reached the conclusion that it was not necessary to
decide this question, and held that even if it were treated
as a contingent remainder it would be alienable under In re
Banks' Will as a "vested interest in a contingent remain-
der." Now, the only contingency, if any, present in this re-
mainder arises from the clause "should they be then living."
This condition can be construed in one of two ways, either
as a condition subsequent or as a condition precedent. If
it was a condition subsequent, then each child took a vested
remainder subject to divestment. But if a condition pre-
cedent then each child had only a contingent remainder.
Now under such a construction, the condition precedent of
survival to the time of the mother's death was a condition
precedent not to the vesting of the entire remainder, but to
;vesting of each child as a class nember. Thus clearly the
remaindermen are unascertained as the contingency goes
to the person, and under It re Banks' Will would be inalien-
able. Yet, the Court held that it was alienable and passed
to the trustee in bankruptcy. The Court said :"?
"In the present case the contingency related to the
event, that is, the survival of the bankrupt and not to
who would take if the event should happen."
Is 151 Md. 216, 134 At. 502, 48 A. L. It. 778 (1926).
"S Williams v. Armiger, 129 Md. 220, 98 At. 542 (1916).
17 151 Md. 221.
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As previously pointed out, a taker is unascertained
either because the description is to be applied as of a future
date, or because there is no one in esse who answers the
description. If it is the latter situation, then the problem
of alienability cannot arise, because there is no prospective
taker in being to attempt to alienate the future interest. So
the problem of alienability of contingent remainders and
executory interests, where the taker is unascertained, is
necessarily restricted to cases where there is a prospective
taker who answers the description. As the description is
to be applied at a future date, this prospective taker must
survive to that date. But this case holds that survival of a
prospective taker to the time for ascertainment is an event
and his interest is therefore alienable. Thus if the case of
Reilly v. Mackenzie is followed, then the entire common law
rule of inalienability of contingent remainders and executory
interests is abolished in Maryland. All contingent remain-
ders and executory interests are alienable by a prospective
taker, and if there is no prospective taker in esse the prob-
lem of alienability cannot arise.
This interpretation of Reilly v. Mackenzie as entirely
abolishing the common law rule of inalienability of contin-
gent remainders and executory interests and overruling the
decision in In re Banks' Will, was followed by the United
States District Court for Maryland in In re Moore,' another
case involving the involuntary alienability in bankruptcy of
a contingent remainder "to all and every my then surviving
children" (referring to surviving the life tenant, the testa-
tor's widow). Here we have a remainder contingent upon
ascertainment of the takers, which is postponed until the
death of the life tenant. The Court held this contingent
remainder alienable with the following statement :'
"The court considers it unnecessary to determine
whether, under the law of Maryland, this remainder is
vested or contingent, because in Maryland it has long
been recognized that a remainder is assignable, even if
continqent. . . .And it has quite recently been held
that, under the terms of a will similar to those here in
Is 22 Fed. (2d) 432 (19M).1 Ibid.
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question, the bankrupt has such an interest as will pass
to his trustee, without regard to whether it is vested or
contingent. Reilly v. Mackenzie . .."
However, when the same problem reached the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Suskin & Berry v. Rurnley," a
case also involving the involuntary alienability in bank-
ruptcy of a contingent remainder "to the then living issue
or descendants of my said sister" (referring to the death
of the sister, the life tenant), that Court in determining the
Maryland law followed In re Banks' Will in holding this
contingent remainder inalienable. Here the remainder is
clearly contingent because the takers cannot be ascertained
until the death of the life tenant, a future event. But, as in
the case of In re Moore there was a prospective taker, who
as a child of the sister, the life tenant, would acquire a vested
interest if he survived the life tenant. Here, then, we have
the same problem presented as in Reilly v. Mackenzie. That
case held the remainder alienable, while this case held it
inalienable. The Court felt bound by the decision in In re
Banks' Will, and disregarded the subsequent case of Reilly
v. Mackenzie with the statement :21
"That case, however, dealt with what in reality was
a vested remainder subject to being divested upon cer-
tain contingencies."
True, as has previously herein been pointed out, the
Maryland Court of Appeals might have disposed of that
case by holding the remainder vested subject to divestment
and therefore alienable. But the Court refused to make
such an interpretation, and expressly held that even though
contingent it was alienable. Under no reasonable inter-
pretation can Reilly v. Mackenzie be reconciled with the
earlier case of In re Banks' Will. Our only conclusion must.
be to agree with the opinion in the case of In re Moore,
namely, that under Maryland law contingent remainders
and executory interests are alienable whether the contin-
gency arises because of a condition precedent or because
the taker is unaseertained.
- 37 Fed. (2d) 304 (1930).1 bid, W0T.
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Even if we assume that remainders and executory inter-
ests contingent upon ascertainment of the taker are inalien-
able, yet there are several conveyancing devices which can
be successfully used to alienate inter vivos such interests.
The most commonly used device is the warranty deed.
Where a deed purports to convey a present possessory es-
tate, either from the existence of covenants of title or from
the phraseology of the conveyancing clause, the grantor is
estopped to set up any after-acquired title in derogation of
his deed This is usually spoken of as the doctrine of
estoppel by deed. Actually the conveyance does not at its
execution pass the inalienable contingent interest of the
grantor. But if the contingency results favorably to the
grantor so as to vest him with a vested estate, this doctrine
of estoppel operates automatically to pass this after-ac-
quired vested estate under the deed. Thus, by indirect
means an inalienable contingent future interest can be, in
effect, alienated inter vivos. Surprisingly, the doctrine of
estoppel by deed as a device for transferring an inalienable
interest has never been passed upon by our Court of Ap-
peals, yet in every state where the question has been raised
the doctrine has been upheld as passing the interest when
it becomes vested.2 '
In addition, if the conveyance, whether in the form of
an executory contract or of an executed conveyance, was
executed for valuable consideration, equity will enforce the
contract by specific performance when the interest has be-
come vested. Thus, full alienability exists in equity for all
contingent remainders and executory interests when a valu-
able consideration has been paid. Here again the convey-
ance can not become operative in equity until the interest
has vested in the grantor, but when the contingency favor-
able to the grantor has occurred, specific performance is
then obtainable against him. Schapiro v. Howard 2 recog-
nizes ind approves this doctrine, although the opinion inti-
mates that there was some doubt in the case whether a "sub-
stantial and valuable consideration" was paid. Subse-
"Cases listed in note 7, Restatement of Property, Tentative Draft No. 4,
page 125. See also Simes, Future Interests, See. 710.
23 113 Md. 360, 78 AtI. 58, 140 Am. St. Rep. 414 (1910).
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quently, in Keys v. Keys"4 the doctrine was approved, and
a conveyance of a mere expectancy was enforced by specific
performance upon proof of a fair and adequate considera-
tion. Certainly if a bare expectancy is alienable in equity,
then all contingent remainders and executory interests are
likewise alienable in equity.
c. Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry
In dealing with the problem of the alienability of possi-
bilities of reverter and rights of entry, we are confronted
with the fact that they are inherently contingent interests.
Both depend upon the happening of a condition precedent.
Yet, being reversionary in character, the takers are fully
ascertained at all times. By analogy to contingent remain-
ders and executory interests where the takers are ascer-
tained, it might be argued that they should be freely alien-
able even though contingent. But we are confronted with
an additional factor which operates against free alienability,
i. e., the fact that neither interest is subject to the rule
against perpetuities. 5 This permits the creation of possi-
bilities of reverter and rights of entry which are extremely
tenuous in nature, and which become defects in the title of
long continuance." Their nuisance value can be greatly
mitigated by being made inalienable. It is for this reason
that the courts have hesitated to extend free alienability to
these two future interests. Although bqth are reversionary
in character, yet they have a fundamental difference in
operation. In the case of a possibility of reverter, the oc-
currence of the condition precedent operates immediately
and automatically to terminate and limit the determinable
fee simple estate of the grantee, and to convert the mere
possibility of a future estate into an immediate possessory
estate. In the case of a right of entry, the grantee's estate
is not terminated, yet there arises in the owner of the right
-" 148 Md. 397, 129 Ati. 504 (1925).
5 Slimes. Future Interests. Sees. 50 and 507.
2o An example of the abuse of the right of entry is familiar to residents
of Boston. The building at 50-56 Mt. Vernon Street, in the center of Beacon
Hill district, cannot be built higher than thirteen feet. It appears that the
restriction was originally created so that the owner of the building on the
opposite side of the street could keep his cattle in view as they grazed on
the Common. See Boston Herald, Dec. 17, 1034.
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of entry a chose in action to enforce a forfeiture of the gran-
tee's estate. Until exercised, no estate arises in the owner
of this right of entry. This difference in legal theory has
influenced the courts in determining their alienability inter
vivos.
The question of alienability inter vivos of possibilities of
reverter has never been definitely passed on in Maryland:
In Kelso v. Stigar27 the court strongly intimated that a mere
possibility of reverter was not an alienable interest and
therefore not an asset of an insolvent debtor. 8 In jurisdic-
tions where the problem has been decided, the cases are
about equally divided as to the alienability of this future in-
terest." Those supporting alienability are influenced by
the fact that there is no contingency as to the taker, who is
always fully ascertained, while those upholding the inalien-
ability view are largely influenced by the desire to reduce the
nuisance value of these interests. In this connection it is
well to note that, through the fact that a possibility of re-
verter becomes an immediate possessory estate on happen-
ing of the condition precedent, it more closely resembles a
reversion than a right of entry. On the contrary, the fact
that it depends upon a condition precedent and is therefore
contingent makes it more analogous to a right of entry than
a reversion, which, as above stated, is always a vested es-
tate. The view adopted by a particular court as to its
alienability is largely influenced by the court's opinion
whether a possibility of reverter is more analogous to a
reversion than a right of entry. The Restatement of Prop-
erty80 adopts the alienability view upon this basis. Two
members of the Council of that Restatement forcefully dis-
sented from this position.""
As for rights of entry, no American case has been found
which, without the aid of statute, has positively upheld the
alienability of a right of entry before breach of the condi-
2T 75 Md. 376, 24 AtI. 18 (1f92).
" A careful examination of thne conveyance discloses that the interest In
question was in reality a right of entry. However, the court treated the
estate conveyed as a determinable fee simple, thus leaving a possibility of
reverter in the grantor.
"' For a full discussion of all cases see Restatement of Property, Tenta-
tive Draft No. 4, 107-111
11 Sec. 1.59.53 Supra note 09 for their written dissent.
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tion; and only two states have upheld alienation after
breach. On the contrary, numerous states have denied
alienability both before and after breach."2 These decisions
have been influenced by the fact that a right of entry is not
itself a possibility of an estate but merely a possibility of a
chose in action to obtain the grantee's estate by forfei, ure.
This is illustrated by the fact that breach of the condition
does not vest an estate in the owner of the right of entry,
but creates merely a chose in action to enforce a forfeiture.
One court 33 described a right of entry as a contingent chose
in action. Thus, although a right of entry closely resembles
a possibility of reverter in practical results, those states
upholding the alienability of possibilities of reverter still
follow the long established rule of the inalienability.of rights
of entry. 4 There is no Maryland decision positively deny-
ing the alienability of a right of entry, although Gwynn v.
Jones"5 contains a strong intimation that at common law a
right of entry is unassignable even after breach. So strong
has been the opposition to permitting rights of entry to be
assignable, that several courts have refused to apply the
doctrine of estoppel by deed or have refused to grant specific
performance in equity as a means of accomplishing an indi-
rect assignmentV
However, where the right of entry supplements a rever-
sion, as for example, where the condition subsequent with
right of entry is found in a conveyance of a leasehold estate
rather than a fee simple estate, then the right of entry is
fully alienable along with the reversion. This is perfectly
consistent, since the reversion is fully alienable, and the
right of entry is a supplemental right attached to the rever-
sion for its full protection. If the right of entry in such a
case were inalienable, the reversion would be less valuable
82 For a full discussion of all cases see Restatement of Property. Tentative
Draft No. 4. pages 112-114. See also Simes, Future Interests, Sec. 716.13 Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 1-9 l11. 318. 21 N. E. 920 (1889).
Fall Creek Township v. Shuman. 55 Ind. App. 232, 103 N. E. 677 (1913).
2 G. & J. 173 (1830).
36Peoria v. Keithley. 299 111. 427 (1921), repudiating the doeirine of
estoppel by deed where the deed contained full covenants of title. Helms v.
Helms. 137 N. C. 206. 49 S. R. 110 (1904) ; Underhill v. S. & W. I. R. Co..
20 Barb. (N. Y.) 455 (1855). Both were cases where the doctrine of snecille
performance was argued but rejected.
"T 32 Henry VIII C. 34. 1 Alexander's British Statutes 440.
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in the hands of an assignee, and as a result the restriction
on the alienation of the right of entry would thereby indi-
rectly restrain alienation of the reversion.
Ordinarily, any attempt to alienate an inalienable inter-
est results in a nullity and the interest still remains in the
grantor. In dealing with an attempted alienation inter
vivos of a right of entry, we run into the startling doctrine
that any attempt to transfer a right of entry results in a
total destruction of the right. Why the grantor should be
penalized for his indiscretion has never been explained.
This doctrine, supported by five American jurisdictions, s is
said to have been established in the English common law.
Actually, no English decision can be found supporting it,
although several English textwriters have cited it as part
of the common law."9 Although no decision repudiating
this doctrine could be found, yet it is hoped that if the
problem is presented in Maryland our Court will repudiate
the doctrine as without reason and historical foundation.
The unreasonableness of the rule was recognized by the
Council formulating the Restatement of Property, but for
lack of any American decision contrary, this legal mon-
strosity was included."0 The d3ctrine has never been ex-
tended to attempts to alienate a possibility of reverter in
jurisdictions denying alienability to that future interest.41
TlsMissmnrrx
In dealing with the question of the transmission of future
interests upon death, we are presented with two dissimilar
problems which the courts often confuse: first, the question
whether the future interest involved is a type that is trans-
missible both by intestate succession and by testamentary
disposition; second, whether this particular future interest
was terminated by the death of its owner, or in other words,
whether the survival of the owner until the time of vesting
S See Restatement of Property, Tentative Draft No. 4, page 115, for a full
discussion of all cases.
Ibid.
Compare the text of the Tentative Draft No. 4, Sec. 201. Comment C,
with that of the Final Draft, See. 160, Comment C.
" Magness v. Kerr, 121 Ore. 373, 254 Pac. 1012 (1927), conceded the ex-
istence of the rule as applied to rights of entry but refused to extend it to
possibilities of reverter, which are likewise inalienable In that state.
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in possession was a condition, precedent or subsequent. In
discussing the question of transmissibility of future interests
in Maryland, there will first be discussed the abstract prob-
lem of what types of interests are transmissible both by in-
testate succession and by testamentary disposition; and then,
the problem of when a condition precedent of survival will
be implied, so as to terminate the particular future interest
involved on death of its owner prior to the time of vesting
in possession.
(a) intestate Succession
The English common law of descent of real property
started with the doctrine that seisin was the stock of de-
scent.2 In other words, descent could only be cast from an
ancestor upon his heir if the ancestor was seized of the prop-
erty at the time of his death. This doctrine was fully satis-
factory when applied to possessbry estates, but was entirely
unsatisfactory when applied to future interests. As long
as an interest is future and not possessory, there can be no
seisin in its owner. As a result, future interests would not
be descendible under this early doctrine. So, as a substitute
for seisin being the stock of descent, the early English cases
developed the doctrine that the last purchaser of a future
interest could cast the descent to his heirs." Thus the doc-
trine became modified so as to read, "seisin or purchase
shall be the stock of descent".
Applying this doctrine to possessory estates, we find no
startling results. When an ancestor dies owning a pos-
sessory estate, he is, of course, seized of this property and
he can, therefore, cast the descent upon his heir, who in turn
becomes seised. Thus the heir can likewise, on death (being
seised) cast the descent upon his own heir. With the one
exception where the seisin is in an adverse possessor, pos-
sessory estates will descend from ancestor to heir and in
turn from the intermediate heir to his own heir.
If this common law doctrine is applied to future inter-
ests, a startling result is reached. An ancestor dies owning
a future interest. He can only cast the descent upon his
"('o. Litt. lib. 158.
"Watkins, Law of Descents (4th Ed. 1837) 33. See also Simes, Future
Interests, Sec. 722.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
heir if he was seized or was the last purchaser. As the in-
terest is future he was not seized. But let us assume that
he acquired the interest as a purchaser."' Thus, as the last
purchaser he can cast the descent to his own heir. But now
suppose the heir dies while the interest is still future. As
the interest is still future, he was never seised, nor was he
a purchaser. He had acquired the interest by descent and'
not as a purchaser. Thus we reach the startling result that
the intermediate heir cannot cast the descent upon his own
heirs. In other words, a future interest acquired by de-
scent is not descendible as long as it remains future. If this
intermediate heir cannot cast the descent, what becomes of
the future interest on his death? Since the intermediate
heir could not be a new stock for descent, the interest must
pass under the original stock of the ancestor, the last pur-
chaser, to the next heirs.
Since a future interest acquired by descent is not de-
scendible as long as it remains future, some courts have
stated the rule to the effect that in the descent of future in-
terests the order of heirship is determined at the time of
the vesting into possession of the future interest and not at
the death of the ancestor.'5 This is an incorrect statement
of the doctrine since it implies that the ownership of the
future interest remains in abeyance between the death of
the ancestor and the time of vesting in possession. On the
contrary we find that the future interest does pass imme-
diately on death of the ancestor to his .heir, and that the
intermediate heir does have certain rights of ownership
over it. True, he cannot cast it by descent to his own heirs
because he cannot qualify as a stock for descent, but-if
alienable-he can alienate it to another."'  And the alienee,
having acquired the future interest by purchase' is the last
purchaser and a new stock of descent, and can thus cast the
"By "purchase" is meant by deed or will. It has no reference to whether
a valuable consideration was paid. The term "purchase" is here used In
contradistinction to descent. See Bouvier's Law Dictionary defining "pur-
chase" as: "A term including every mode of acquisition of estate known
to the law, except that by which an heir on the death of his ancestor be-
comes substituted in his place as owner by operation of law."
," Barnltz's Lessee v. Casey, 7 Cranch 458, 8 L. Ed. 403 (1812).
"See Cunningham v. Moody. 1 ves. Sen. 174, 176-7 (1748).
"See supra note 44.
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descent upon his own heirs."' Likewise, the heir can devise
this future interest,4 9 and the devisee, being the last pur-
chaser, is a new stock of descent, and can cast the descent
upon his own heirs. It is apparent that the heir does hnme-
diately inherit the ancestor's future interests, and that his
ownership thereof, although not entirely complete, is very
real and materiaL
This common law theory of descent was soon recognized
as being a legal anachronism when applied to future inter-
ests, and today we find that Maryland alone supports it. In
all other states, 0 either by statute or decision, the doctrine
is abolished, and future interests are made to descend in the
same order as possessory estates.81
Our Court of Appeals first pronounced in favor of this
common law theory of descent of future interests in the case
of Buck v. Lantz.12  Unfortunately the Court there ex-
plained this doctrine as a rule fbr ascertaining the order of
heirship, rather than a rule determining the stock of de-
scent, with the following statement :"
"The next question is, who are the heirs of Mary
Harwood who are now entitled to the estate? It is clear
that those only can take who are in esse at the time when
the contingency happened and the estate fell into pos-
session."
This statement is an incorrect exposition of the common
law rule for two reasons: first, it implies that a future in-
terest is not descendible until the time that it vests in pos-
session; and second, it intimates that the existence of a con-
tingency is the reason for the non-descendible character,
thus implying that the rule is limited to contingent interests
only. As we have pointed out, the rule is one determining
the stock of descent and not the time of descent, and also the
rule is equally applicable to vested or contingent future es-
11 Stringer v. New, 9 Mod. 363 (1741).
"See Kinaston v. Clark, 2 Atk. 204 (1741).
50 See Restatement of Property, Tentative Draft No. 4, page 134, for a full
discussion of the cases.
'" In four states, South Carolina, New York, North Carolina and Mich-
igan, the descent of rights of entry and possibilities of reverter Is still gov-
erned by the common law rule. See supra note 50.
5249 Md. 439 (1878).
" Ibid. 49 Md. 445.
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tates without distinction. It is unfortunate that our Court
should first have stated the doctrine in this form, for much
of the ambiguity in subsequent cases results from this state-
ment. In Buck v. Lantz the sole question at issue was
whether a contingent remainder was descendible, and the
problem of the course and stock of the descent was not in-
volved.
The next case decided, Conner v. Waring," cuts to the
heart of the problem. That case involved a reversion in
the testator's heirs, two of whom, Mary and Louisa, had died
while the reversion was still future, devising their interests
in the reversion. The question at issue was whether these
two heirs had sufficient ownership of their proportionate
share of this reversion to devise it. The reversion remained
in the original testator on probate of his will disposing of
less than his entire estate. This reversion then descended
to his heirs, of whom Mary and Louisa were two. These
heirs held this reversion by descent, and were neither seized
nor purchasers. Thus they could not be a new stock of de-
scent under the common law doctrine. Both sides conceded
that if Mary and Louisa had died intestate their share of
the reversion would not have descended to their heirs, but
would have passed to the other heirs of the original testator.
But the controversy was over the power of Mary and Louisa
to devise their share of the reversion, and thus make the
devisees purchasers and therefore a new stock of descent.
The Court fully and accurately stated the common law rule,
recognizing the power of an heir to devise a future interest
which he had inherited by descent, with the following state-
ment :15
". . while the estate is thus in expectancy, the in-
termediate heir," (Mary and Louisa) "in whom therreversion may vest, may do acts which the law deems
equivalent to an actual seisin, and which will change
the course of the descent, and make a new root of in-
heritance. Thus, he may by exercising acts of owner-
ship over it, as by granting it for life, or in tail; or by
devising it, or changing it, appropriate it to himself,
and by that means change the course of descent. ...
'.,52 Md. 724 (1880).
' Ibld, 52 Md. 73.
FUTURE INTERESTS
Hence the devises of Mary and Louisa, embracing their
interests in the reversion, as heirs of their father, would
constitute them new stocks of inheritance in respect to
such reversion."
After making this clear and accurate statement of the
common law rule of descent of future interests, the Court
reached the conclusion that if the future interest was equit-
able only, as it was in this case, the legal title being vested
in trustees, the intermediate heir did not have power to
alienate or devise the equitable interest, and thus held the
..devises of Mary and Louisa void. Why an intermediate
heir of a legal future interest should have power to alienate
or devise it so as to create a new stock of descent, while the
intermediate heir of an equitable future interest does not
have this power, cannot be understood from a reading of the
Court's opinion.56 Judge Rose in Shirk v. Lee " interpreted
this distinction as being based on the theory that a convey-
ance or devise of a legal future interest creates constructive
seisin in the grantee or devisee, while a similar conveyance
or devise of an equitable future interest does not. Such an
interpretation restricts the basis of descent to seisin and
entirely omits the doctrine that purchase can be the basis
for descent, since the devisee or grantee of an equitable
future interest is a purchaser, even if he cannot be consid-
ered constructively seized. Can the owner of a future inter-
est ever be seized actually or constructively? Is not seisin,
actual or constructive, restricted to posse~sory estates I This
distinction in the course of descent between equitable and
legal future interests seems never to have been recognized
in earlier English cases.
An examination of subsequent Maryland cases, to deter-
mine whether our Court of Appeals has repudiated or ap-
See Md. Code, Art. 98, Sec. 328,which, in describing the types of property
which can be devised by will, uses the clause: "all lands, . . . which would.
in case of the proprietor dying Intestate, descent to or devolve on his or her
heirs ... shall be subject to be disposed of, transferred and passed by his
or her last will or codicil." Can a negative implication be drawn from
this wording that no property Interest can be devised unless it is descendi-
ble? If so, then an intermediate heir of a future interest, whether legal or
equitable, would not have a devisable Interest, because his interest Is non-
descendible. The Court in Conner v. Waring made no mention of this stat-
ute as affecting the powers of an intermediate heir of a future interest, and
it Is doubtful If such a negative implication Is 'Justifiable.
",3 Fed. (2d) 256 (1924).
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proved this distinction, discloses confusion. In both Garri-
son v. Hill58 and Jenkins v. Bonsal"9 this problem was di-
rectly in issue. The sole question was whether a devise by
an intermediate heir of an equitable contingent remainder,
the legal title being in trustees, was effective. In these
cases the Maryland Court held the devises ineffective upon.
the erroneous theory that the order of heirship could not be
established until the remainder vested in possession. As the
intermediate heirs had died prior to that time, the Court held
they had no interest to devise. The opinions totally ignored
the previous case of Conner v. Waring and failed to place the
decisions upon the fact that the remainders involved were
equitable and not legal. Further to confuse us, we find that in
the later decision of Roberts v. Roberts,0 our Court upheld
the effectiveness of a devise by an intermediate heir of a
vested remainder. It must be noted that in this case the
remainder was legal, so under the distinction set out in
Conner v. Waring it would be devisalile or alienable by the
intermediate heir. However, in the case the devisability of
the remainder was upheld without any reference to the fact
that it was a legal future interest and not an equitable one,
and without reference to the distinction set out in Conner v.
Waring. From these three subsequently decided cases, it is
apparent that this distinction has been in fact followed, if
not specifically recognized in the opinions.
When Judge Rose in Shirk v. Lee 1 was required to de-
cide whether an equitable reversion in one of the testator's
heirs (an intermediate heir) was devisable, he felt bound by
the distinction laid down in Conner v. Waring, and denied
the effectiveness of the devise with the following state-
ment :62
"In plaintiff's view, it has been settled for centuries
that such a devise amounts to taking constructive seizin
of the devisor's share in the estate to which he is at the
time an heir. Defendant replies that such is certainly
not the case in Maryland, when the devise by the heir
51 79 Md. 75, 28 At. 1062, 47 Am. St. Rep. 363 (1894).
"9 116 id. 629, 82 At. 229 (1911).
102 Md. 131, 62 At. 161, 111 Am. St. Rep. 344, I L. R. A. (N. S.) 782
(1905).
11 Supra note 57.
61 Ibid.
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at law is made or attempted to be made at a time when
legal title to the ancestor's estate is in a trustee, as in
this case she says it was ...
"The learned, able, and industrious counsel for the
plaintiff does not deny that upon the facts his case is
indistinguishable from that of Conner v. Warkq . . .
in which the Court of Appeals spoke through the mouth
of the late Judge Alvey. . . . The learned counsel for
the plaintiff argues that the holding in that case cannot
be logically reconciled with much which was said and
decided by the same court in cases preceding and fol-
lowing it. Nevertheless, so far as we know, it has
never been in terms overruled, or indeed even so much
as criticized, by the court which made it."
(b) Testamentary Disposition
The power to devise by will freehold interests in land,
either possessory or future, is not a creature of the common
law. Such a right was first created by the English Wills
Act."' Therefore, any discussion of the power of trans-
mission by testamentary disposition depends upon the ex-
press provisions of the Maryland Code.
Fortunately our Maryland statute" is very explicit in
providing that "all lands, tenements and hereditaments
which might pass by deed, and which would . . . descend to
or devolve on his or her heirs . . . and all rights of entry
for a condition broken, and all rights and possibilities of
reverter shall be subject to be disposed 9f, transferred and
passed by his or her last will or codicil". In Fisher v.
Wagner65 the Maryland Court held that under this statute
all reversions, vested and contingent remainders, executory
interests, and possibilities of an estate are devisable, if sur-
vival until the time of vesting in possession is not an implied
or express condition. It is likewise fortunate that our
statute by express words makes all rights of entry and pos-
sibilities of reverter devisable, since in many jurisdictions
a controversy has developed whether these extremely tenu-
ous future interests are within their wills acts."
32 Henry ViII C. 1 (1540).
Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 328.
109 IMd. 243, 71 Atl. 999, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 121 (1909).
° See Restatement of Property, Tentative Draft No. 4, page 13, for a
discussion of types of statutes and for a list of jurisdictions holding rights
of entry and possibilities of reverter not to be devisable.
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(c) Survival as an Implied Condition Precedent
In the foregoing discussion of the transmission of future
interests upon death, it has been assumed that the death of
the owner has not terminated the future interest involved.
In other words, survival of the owner until a future date,
usually until the time of vesting in possession, was neither a
condition precedent nor a condition subsequent. However,
in many cases the death of the owner of the future interest
involved does terminate its existence. This results either
because survival of the owner is a condition precedent, or
because death of the owner is a condition subsequent. It
should be noted that if survival is a condition precedent, then
the future interest is contingent and must be either a con-
tingent remainder or executory interest. But, if death
operates as a condition subsequent, then the future interest
is vested subject to divestment, and thus must be either a
vested remainder or reversion. It must also be noticed
that death alone without any other condition is normally
construed to be a condition precedent, while death coupled
with another condition, such as death leaving children or
death without issue, is always a condition subsequent.7
Death as a condition subsequent, divesting a vested re-
mainder or reversion, can only arise where there is an ex-
press provision to that effect in the creating instrument.
No case can be found where the courts have implied the
existence of death as a condition subsequent. However,
survival as a condition precedent can be implied. It is the
present writer's purpose now to discuss the circumstances
which have justified our Court of Appeals in raising an im-
plied condition precedent of survival, thereby rendering the
future interest involved non-transmissible, not because of
its future character but because of its termination by the
owner's death.
In many cases where survival as a condition precedent
has been implied, the implication has been based upon the
existence of particular wording in the creating instrument.
See Cox v. Handy, 78 Md. 108, 27 At. 227, 501 (1893) for an excellent
discussion of death as a condition subsequent. In that case death leaving
children was construed as a condition subsequent, thus creating a vested
remainder subject to divestment.
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In these cases no express provision, requiring survival until
the time for vesting in possession, can be found, but the
phraseology used by the testator or grantor seems to imply
that the interest is only to take effect in possession if the
taker is living at the time of vesting in possession. This
rule is often stated as follows: "if the language is that of
a present gift, with possession or enjoyment only postponed,
then there is no condition precedent of survivorship, but
.. . if futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift, then
the gift is subject to a condition precedent of survivor-
ship."68  In High v. Pollock"' there is an excellent illustra-
tion of survival implied as a condition precedent because
words of futurity were annexed to the substance of the gift.
In that case the bequeathing words were directly modified
by the clause, "provided he arrives" at the age of twenty-
four. Our Court construed these words as creating a condi-
tion precedent of survivorship until that age with the fol-
lowing statement :*
"We think the language used by the testator clearly
discloses the intent on his part to make the vesting of
this estate contingent upon the legatee reaching the age
of twenty-four years, and thereby takes it out of the
rule above given, and as the legatee died before reach-
ing the age the estate never vested in him."
The application of the "divide-and-pay-over" rule, to
raise an implied condition of survival until the time of dis-
tribution, is nothing more than a corollary of this theory
that, if futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift and.
not merely to its enjoyment, survivorship will be implied.
This "divide-and-pay-over" rule is often stated as follows:
"where the only words of gift are found in the direction to
divide or pay at a future time, the gift is future, not imme-
diate; contingent and not vested.'1 1 By "contingent," of
course, the courts mean subject to an implied condition pre-
cedent that the legatee or devisee survive the period of
03 Simes, Future Interests, Sec. 851.
69 114 Md. 580, 80 AtM 43 (1911). See also Lee v. O'Donnell, 95 Md. 538,
52 Atl. 979 (1902) where the provision, "from and immediately after the
death" of the life tenant, was held to imply a condition precedent of sur-
vival until the life tenant's death.
TO 114 Md. 587.
71 In re Crane, 164 N. Y. 71, 58 N. E. 47 (1900).
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distribution. In Martin v. Cook"2 our Court of Appeals
recognized and approved this rule but held that the facts
of the case were such that the rule was inapplicable. In
that case the direction to divide and pay over in the future
was postponed merely to let in a preceding life estate. The
rule is subject to the well recognized exception that "if the
postponement of the payment is for the purpose of letting
in an intermediate estate, then the interest shall be deemed
vested at the death of the testator, and the class of legatees
is to be determined as of that date, for futurity is not an-
nexed to the substance of the gift.""
In the above cases our Court of Appeals was able to
imply survivorship as a condition precedent because of the
express wording of the instrument, thus the implication was
one in fact and not one in law. Now we are faced with the
problem whether survival as a condition precedent will ever
be implied without the aid of any express wording in the
instrument. This we might call a matter of its being im-
plied in law. It is startling to learn that our Court of Ap-
peals, along with a majority of the courts, has implied a
condition of survivorship without the help of any express
wording in the instrument, but solely because the future
interest involved was a gift to a class.
(1) Gi*ts to a Designated Person
Where the future interest is created in a specially desig-
nated person either by name or description, there has never
been any tendency of the courts to imply a condition prece-
dent of survivorship until the time of vesting in possession.
Of course, where the wording in the creating instrument
indicates the grantor's or testator's intention that the inter-
est is only to take effect in possession if the designated
taker is living at that time, the courts have no hesitancy
in construing the instrument as creating a condition prece-
dent of survival. Such a condition is one implied from
the instrument's wording and not from the character of the
taker. No case can be found where the Maryland Court of
"129 Md. 195, 08 At. 489 (1916).
tI In re Crane, supra note 71.
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Appeals has ever raised an implied condition precedent of
survival without the aid of particular words in the creating
instrument, where the gift was to a designated and ascer-
tained person or persons. In fact, in the leading case of
Fisher v. JVagncr74 our Court expressly held that, in the
absence of a contrary provision in the will, all future inter-
ests to a designated person are transmissible on death, and
no condition precedent of survival will be implied. The
Court said :"'
"This case therefore clearly recognized the rule
that where the person to take is certain, contingent es-
tates of inheritance, as well as springing and executory
uses, etc. are transmissible by descent, and are devis-
able and assignable, . . . It further clearly recognized
the distinction between a case where an individual is
named, or definitely described as the party to take, and
one where there is a limitation to a class."
If the person to take is a designated person or persons,
it is immaterial whether the interest is vested, a vested re-
mainder or reversion,"8 or whether it is contingent, a con-
tingent remainder or executory interest. No condition
precedent of survival will be implied in the absence of such a
provision in the instrument. Clearly if the interest is other-
wise vested, it would be contrary to policy to imply a condi-
tion precedent of survival, thus making the interest con-
tingent. But even where the interest.is otherwise con-
tingent, because it depends upon the happening of another
event, these cases have refused to imply a condition prece-
dent of survival so as to create an additional contingency,
where the taker is a designated individual In this latter
situation the taker is sometimes said to have a "vested
interest in a contingent estate". 8
74 Supra note 65.
,ld, 109 Md. 25,..
,0 Wilson v. Pichon, 162 Md. 199. 159 Att. 766 (1032) vested remainder to
designated persons held transmissible on death prior to time of vesting in
possession.
" Fisher v. Wagner, supra note 05; Buck v. Lantz, supra note 52; Mc-
Clurg v. Myers. 129 Md. 112, 98 AtL 491 (1916) ; Rosenzwog v. Gould, 131 Md.
209, 101 Atl. 63 (1917). All were cases of alternative contingent remainders
to designated persons held transmissible upon death prior to the happening
of the contingency and the vesting in possession.
,1 See note 13.
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(2) Gifts to a Class
In dealing with class gifts, the courts are faced with the
proposition of determining at what time the membership of
a class is to be ascertained. In ascertaining the member-
ship of a class, we are confronted with two problems: first;
when does the class open, and second, when does it close.
By opening the class we mean the earliest time at which a
class member acquires an alienable and transmissible inter-
est in the class gift. Prior to the time of opening, a
prospective class member has no transmissible interest, as
survival to the time of opening is a condition precedent.
Whether such a prospective class member has an alienable
interest in Maryland depends upon whether the interpreta-
tion of Reilly v. Mackenzie"9 in the first part of this article
was correct. At the time of opening of the class each living
person then qualifying takes an alienable and transmissible
interest in the class gift.
The time of closing of a class is the time after which no
further person can qualify as a class member, or in other
words, the time after which no after-born person can become
a member. During this interim, if any exists, between the
opening and closing of a class, any newly qualifying person
will become a member and likewise take an alienable and
transmissible share in the class gift. The earliest point at
which a class can open is, of course, the death of the testator,
or in case of creation by a deed the time of its execution and
deliveryma As a rule of convenience, in the absence of a con-
19 Supra note 15.
1'a Md. Code Supp., Art. 93, Sec. 335A, extends the benefits of the Mary-
land lapse statute (Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 335) to a prospective class mem-
ber who dies before the testator and thus before the class has opened. This
statute does not operate to open the class at the date of the execution of
the will, since the lapse statute has been expressly construed as not giving
a transmissible interest to a devisee or legatee who predeceases the testator,
but as substituting his heirs in his place as legatees or devisees. The heirs
do not take by descent through the deceased legatee or devisee but as sub-
stituted legatees or devsees. Glenn v. Belt, 7 G. & J. 362 (1835); Mc-
Loughlin v. McGee, 131 Md. 156, 101 Atl. 682 (1917). Thus, a prospective
class member who predeceases the testator does not have a transmissible
interest, but when the class does open on the testator's death, the heirs of
such prospective class member take his share under the statute as original
class members. In addition it must be noticed that the statute Is expressly
made inapplicable where there is an express or Implied condition precedent
of survival until the testator's death.
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trary provision in the instrument, a class will never close
until the time of distribution, or in other words, the time of
vesting in possession. Thus, in the case of future interests
to a class, if the class opens on the death of the testator
there will always be an interim between that date and the
time of vesting in possession, during which the class is open
and during which its membership is being ascertained.
During this interim, the share of each member is subject to
deci ease by the qualifying of new additional members. We
usually speak of this share of a qualified member as being
"vested subject to opening," meaning subject to decrease
in size by the addition of new members. Of course, in many
cases the class description is such that it is physically im-
possible for new members to qualify during this interim.
An example would be a future interest in the "children of
A," when A is already dead. No after-born child of A is
physically possible although technically the class will re-
main open until the time for vesting in possession.
From the foregoing disoussion we can see that the ascer-
tainment of the class is not necessarily an instantaneous
event, but may be a continuing event from the death of the
testator until the time of vesting in possession. Also we
see that the time of opening of the class is the time at which
a class member acquires a transmissible share in the class
gift. Therefore, if survival until a future time is a condi-
tion precedent, the class cannot open until that time. In
other words, as long as survival is a condition precedent,
the class cannot open since a member could not acquire a
transmissible interest. If survival until the time of vesting
in possession is either an express or implied condition pre-
cedent, then clearly the class does not open until the time
of vesting in possession. Since that is also the time of
closing the class, the opening and closing are simultaneous
and the ascertainment of the class membership has become
an instantaneous event. So whether a person answering the
class description has a transmissible interest between the
time of the testator's death and the time of vesting in pos-
session depends upon whether survival until the latter time
is either an express or implied condition precedent. Our
problem is, when will such a condition of survival be im-
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plied, without the aid of any provision in the creating in-
strument, merely because the future interest is to a class.
We have found that where the future interest is to a
designated individual, no condition precedent of survival
will be implied whether the interest is vested or contingent.
But in applying the problem to class gifts, we find that we
must distinguish between whether the entire class gift is
vested or contingent. If the class gift is otherwise vested,
that is, subject to no other condition precedent, our Court
of Appeals will not imply a condition precedent of survival.'*
In other words, if the class gift is otherwise a vested re-
mainder, the class will open at the death of the testator,
thereby giving to each qualifying member at that date an
alienable and transmissible interest. His share is a
"vested interest in a vested remainder". To imply a con-
dition precedent of survival until the time of vesting in pos-
session in this type of situation would be to postpone the
opening of the class, thus making the takers unascertainable
until the time of vesting in possession, and thus turn an
apparently vested remainder into a contingent remainder.
In Brian v. Tylor8 ' our Court carefully pointed out that if
the future interest was otherwise vested and not contingent,
the class must be opened at the testator's death so as to
give to those qualifying at that time a ve9ted transmissible
interest. The Court said:
"If the law thus favors the vesting of property it
necessarily favors its vesting at the earliest period.
Every postponement of vesting renders it contingent
and uncertain at least as to the person who is to take.
No reason can be assigned as to the vesting itself that
will not apply to the earliest period. In the absence
of plain expressions or intent plainly inferrible from
the terms of the will, the earliest time for the vesting
will be adopted where there is more than one period
mentioned in the will. It is a question of intention and
the testator has ample power to fix the period of vesting
S°Tayloe v. AMosher, 29 Md. 443 (188) ; Cox v. Handy, supra note 67:
Hoover v. Smith, 96 Md. 393, 54 Atl. 102 (1903); Ridgely v. Rldgely, 100
Md. 230, 59 Ati. 731 (1905); In re Gilman Estate, 126 Md. 036, 95 Ati. 60
(1915) ; Brian v. Tylor, 129 Md. 145, 98 Atl. 532 (1916) ; Swift v. Cook, 13.3
Ald. 651, 105 Atl. 869 (1919) ; Lee v. WaltJen, 141 Md. 450 and 458, 119 AtL
2-16 and 249 (1922).
" Supra note 80.
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to suit himself (always within the time the rule of laIw
fixes), but lie must indicate his wish with reasonable
certainty, for if he does not the law will presume he
intended the earliest time. .... s,
"In the clause here in question the remainder to
Mr. Clark's 'heirs in direct descent' was not made de-
pendent upon a continqency, but the enjoyment of it
was postponed until the death of the life tenant, and
unless we are to depart from the settled rule of con-
struction, or impute to the testator an intention not
expressed in his will and contrary to the natural mean-
ing of the terms employed, those who were his heirs at
the time of his death took vested remainders."8
This interest in the vested remainder of a class member,
qualifying at the testator's death, may be indefeasibly
vested,"4 as where there is no further physical possibility of
additional class members; vested subject to opening," as
where there is a possibility of further additional class mem-
bers qualifying; or vested subject to divestment upon the
happening of an express condition subsequent. 6  If it is
this latter situation, the condition subsequent may be the
class member's death before the time of vesting in posses-
sion, but only if the death is a conditional death, such as
death without children or death leaving children. It must
be remembered that mere death alone is normally construed
to be a condition precedent, and thus would expressly pre-
vent the opening of the class until the time of vesting in
possession.
From a careless reading of several Maryland cases,67
one might conclude that in those cases our Court of Ap-
peals had implied a condition precedent of survival where
the remainder to a class was otherwise vested. But a care-
"Thid, 129 Md. 152.
mibd, 129 Md. 15T.
"Swift v. Cook, supra note 80; Brian v. Tylor, supra note S0; Hoover v.
Smith, supra note 80.
" Tayloe v. Mosher, supra note 80; In re Gilman Estate, supra note 80.
In this latter case no person satisfying the class description was in esse at
the testator's death, but subsequently, during the period that the class was
open, a child was born, who immediately took a vested Interest subject to
opening.
" Cox v. Handy, supra note 67; Lee v. WaltJen, supra note 80; Ridgely v.
Ridgely, supra note 80.
1t Larmour v. Rich, 71 Md. 369, 18 AtL 702 (1889) ; Cherbonnier v. Good-
win, 79 Md. 55, 28 AtL 894 (1894) ; Stahl v. Emery, 147 Md. 128, 127 At.
760 (1925).
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ful examination of these will disclose that in all but one
case the Court very carefully based its opinion upon specific
words in the will indicating the intention of the testator that
the class should not be opened until the time of vesting in
possession.28  Our Court was not implying a condition of
survival but was construing the testator's own words. Only
in Staid v. Emery 9 is there any intimation that, in an other-
wise vested remainder to a class, our Court will of its own
initiative postpone the opening of the class until the time of
distribution; and a careful reading of this case discloses
that the statement is dictum since the facts involved a prob-'
lem of lapse, i. e., death prior to the testator's, and not of
transmission, i. e., death subsequent to the testator's.
In the case of future interests to designated individuals,
we found that no implied condition of survival will be raised,
irrespective whether the interest involved is otherwise con-
tingent upon another event. In those cases unless there is
a contrary provision in the creating instrument, the desig-
nated person will always take a "vested interest in the con-
tingent remainder or executory interest" at the testator's
death. In those cases the fact that the entire gift is con-
tingent does not prevent the designated taker from taking a
transmissible interest immediately on death of the testator.
However, if a future interest is to a class rather than a
designated individual, and if that interest is otherwise con-
tingent upon an entirely separate condition precedent, i. e.,
a contingent remainder or executory interest; then our
Court of Appeals, along with the majority of jurisdictions,
will imply a condition precedent of survival until the other
condition precedent occurs. In other words the class will
not open until the other contingency happens. Usually this
other contingency or condition precedent does not occur
until the time of vesting in possession, and as*a result the
class never opens until that time and then closes immedi-
ately. This position was first announced in Demill v.
Reid.10 The case involved an alternative contingent re-
80 Larmour v. Rich, supra note 87. and Cherbonnier v. Goodwin. supra
note 87, are fully explained in Lee v. WaltJen, supra note 80, at page 456.
See also Wilson v. Pichon, supra note 76, for another complete analysis of
those cases.
6' Supra note 87.
71 M I. 175, 17 AtI. 1014 (1889).
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mainder to the "children" of Henry. This remainder was
contingent upon the life tenant John dying without issue.
Henry had six children, three of whom died before the life
tenant, leaving only three children living when the contin-
gency, the death of John without issue, occurred. The ques-
tion at issue was whether the three deceased children had
transmissible shares in the class gift. If the class opened
at the testator's death all six had acquired "vested interests
in a contingent remainder" which would be alienable and
transmissible. But if survival until the contingency hap-
pened could be implied, then the class did not open until the
life tenant died, and only the three living children shared
in the class gift. The Court reached the conclusion that
where a limitation to a class is itself contingent upon the
happening of a condition precedent, survival until that con-
tingency occurred is an implied condition precedent to mem-
bership in the class. The Court said:"
"It seems to us to be clear law, as well as good
sense, that in a case like this where there is an ultimate
limitation upon a contingency to a class of persons
plainly described, and there are persons answering the
description in esse when the contingency happens, they
alone can. take."
This position was subsequently approved and followed
in the case of Schapiro v. Howard,2 which also involved an
alternative contingent remainder to a class. Also in Fisher
v. Wagner," a case involving an alternative contingent re-
mainder to a designated individual, the opinion carefully
points out the difference between a contingent remainder to
a class and one to a designated individual, and fully explains
this decision in Demill v. Reid.
What is the reason for implying a condition precedent
of survival until the happening of the contingency in the
case of a contingent remainder or executory interest to a
class, and not applying the same rule to a contingent re-
mainder or executory interest to a designated individual?
Also why should survival be implied in class gifts where
OI Ibld, 71 Md. 191.
Supra note 23.
"Supra note 65.
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the entire limitation is contingent, but not implied where
the limitation is otherwise vested? Our Court of Appeals
has never explained the reason for the rule. Possibly the
rule resulted from the failure of courts to distinguish be-
tween the terms "contingent" and "transmissible". Many
cases have assumed that any. iuterest that was contingent
was also non-transmissible, yet we have clear-cut decisions
in Maryland that a contingent remainder to a designated
individual is transmissible." Some courts have attempted
to explain the rule by saying that "it is not to be supposed
that the testator intended that the members of the class
should be fixed before it is determined that there is to be a
bequest." '  Actually, does a testator ever realize that
where he makes a class gift contingent he implies a condition
of survival, but if he makes the class gift vested he does not
imply a condition of survivalI As a matter of fact, in the
absence of a contrary intention shown by the will, does not
a testator in using a class description think of that descrip-
tion as applied at his death whether the gift is contingent
or vested? There has been a great deal of criticism of this
rule as without reason, and as an arbitrary construction by
the courts of the testator's intent. Although probably a
majority of the courts still support the rule, yet a growing
minority have repudiated it."
CONOCLSIoN
In conclusion the author offers for consideration the fol-
lowing questions:
1. In view of the apparent conflict between In re Bank's
Will9 and Reilly v. Mackenzie"s as to the alienability of a
contingent remainder or executory interest by a prospective
class member, should Maryland adopt a statute making
alienable "any interest in land whether immediate or future,
vested or contingent?""
" Supra note 77.
98 Savela v. Erlckson, 138 Minn. 93, 163 N. W. 1029 (1917).
Is Simes, Future Interests, Sec. 391, for a full discussion of cases.
t
v Supra note 12.
0" Supra note 15.
"1Three states have such statutes: Alabama Civ. Code (1928), See.
6837; Ohio Probate Code (1932), See. 10512-4; Rhode Island Gen. Laws
(1923), Sec. 4265.
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2. As Maryland is the only state applying the common
law rules of descent to future interests, should a statute be
adopted providing that all future interests, including rights
of entry and possibilities of reverter, which are not termin-
ated by the death of the owner, shall pass in case of intestate
succession in the same manner as possessory interests ?1
3. Should our Court of Appeals re-examine the posi-
tion taken in Demill v. Reid,"'1 to the effect that a condition
precedent of survival will always be implied in the case of
a contingent remainder or executory interest to a class, but
not so implied if the contingent remainder or executory
interest is to a designated individual?
Rule stated in Restatement of Property, See. 20.
101 Supra note 90.
